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ABSTRACT
This thesis shows that existing definitions of code-injection attacks (e.g., SQL-injection
attacks) are flawed. The flaws make it possible for attackers to circumvent existing mech-
anisms, by supplying code-injecting inputs that are not recognized as such. The flaws also
make it possible for benign inputs to be treated as attacks. After describing these flaws
in conventional definitions of code-injection attacks, this thesis proposes a new definition,
which is based on whether the symbols input to an application get used as (normal-form)
values in the application’s output. Because values are already fully evaluated, they cannot
be considered “code” when injected. This simple new definition of code-injection attacks
avoids the problems of existing definitions, improves our understanding of how and when
such attacks occur, and enables us to evaluate the effectiveness of mechanisms for mitigating
such attacks.
v
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
As the popularity of web applications has increased, so have reports of attacks against
them [1, 2, 3]. The most commonly reported type of attack involves injecting code into a
program output by an application, as in SQL-injection attacks [3].
Standard examples of code-injection attacks include an attacker entering the following
strings as input to an application:
1. ’ OR 1=1 - -, to make the application output the program SELECT balance FROM
acct WHERE password=‘’ OR 1=1 - -’ (underlined symbols are those the attacker
has injected into the output program). This SQL program always returns the bal-
ance(s) from the acct table, even though an empty-string password is supplied,
because: (1) the 1=1 subexpression is true, making the entire WHERE clause true,
and (2) the - - command comments out the final apostrophe to make the program
syntactically valid. In this case, the attacker has injected the code symbols OR, =,
and - - into the output program.
2. exit(), to make the application output the program SELECT balance FROM acct
WHERE pin=exit(). In this case, the attacker has injected the code symbols exit()
into the output program to mount a denial-of-service attack against the remote
database.
These attacks are commonly referred to as “code-injection attacks” or “command-
injection attacks” (CIAs, or just IAs), but here we use the more specific term “code-injection
attacks on outputs” (CIAOs) to distinguish these attacks, which require code to be injected
into an application’s output, from more general notions of CIAs, which require code to be
injected only into memory used by an application (e.g., [4]).
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Much research has focused on mechanisms for mitigating CIAOs, and a few efforts have
been made to define CIAOs rigorously [5, 6, 7]. However, as Chapter 2 discusses, existing
definitions are based on the flawed belief that CIAOs occur whenever an application’s input
alters the syntactic structure of its output program. Incorrectly conflating CIAOs with
changes to syntactic structures causes existing definitions to be neither sound nor complete:
some CIAOs are not recognized as CIAOs (false negatives), and some non-CIAOs are recog-
nized as CIAOs (false positives). The false negatives allow attackers to circumvent existing
mechanisms for preventing CIAOs.
Without a satisfactory definition of CIAOs, we can’t effectively develop or analyze mech-
anisms for mitigating them; preventing CIAOs in general requires understanding exactly
how and when they succeed. As Sun Tzu’s The Art of War famously expresses it, “If you
know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat” [8].
This is a paper about “knowing the enemy”; it defines precise circumstances under which
CIAOs can be said to occur. Defining CIAOs requires two subdefinitions: first we must
define which symbols in applications’ output programs constitute code; second we must
define when symbols have been injected into output programs. The primary contribution
and novelty of this thesis lies in the first of these subdefinitions; the second subdefinition
can be approached with well-known (but difficult-to-implement) techniques of taint tracking.
For the first subdefinition, this thesis defines “code” significantly differently from previous
work—instead of code being parse-tree-changing symbols, code here refers to symbols that
do not form values (i.e., fully evaluated terms). This thesis argues that CIAOs occur when
at least one symbol injected into an output program is used outside of a value.
To keep the definitions general, this thesis tries to abstract as much as possible from
underlying languages, programs, and system architectures. Although the definitions will
require a few technical assumptions about the languages of applications’ output programs
(such as that they have a well-defined set of normal-form values), this thesis’s definitions are
not limited to SQL or other popular programming languages; the new definition of CIAOs
applies equally well to other code-injection attacks (e.g., LDAP-injection, HTML/script-
injection (XSS), and shell-injection attacks). Similarly, the only assumption we make of
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applications is that tainted inputs can be correctly tracked through them, so we know
which symbols in their outputs have been injected.
1.1 Summary of Contributions and Roadmap
This thesis demonstrates problems in the conventional definition of CIAOs (in Chap-
ter 2). The problems make existing CIAO-mitigating mechanisms neither sound nor complete—
some CIAOs are considered benign, while some non-CIAOs are considered attacks. After
discussing previous work, the paper presents (in Chapters 3–4) a new definition of CIAOs
that avoids these problems.
Ultimately, a definition of CIAOs has two important high-level uses. First, a definition
of CIAOs enables us to precisely determine whether applications exhibit CIAOs. We put
the new definition to this first use by illustrating the new definition’s improved ability
to determine whether applications exhibit CIAOs (primarily in Chapter 3.3). Second, a
definition of CIAOs enables us to analyze the effectiveness of mechanisms at mitigating
CIAOs. We put the new definition to this second use by analyzing the effectiveness of
several classes of mechanisms for detecting CIAOs (in Chapter 5).
More specifically, several properties of CIAOs become apparent by considering the new
definitions:
1. Defining CIAOs as occurring when nonvalue symbols get injected into output pro-
grams improves our ability to recognize attacks. We illustrate the improvements in
an idealized version of SQL called SQL◦, “SQL Diminished” (Chapters 3–4.1).
2. CIAOs can be classified as copy-based or data-dependency-based, depending on
how applications propagate untrusted (tainted) inputs into output programs (Sec-
tion 4.2.7).
3. A class of attacks related to CIAOs exists, which we call code-interference attacks.
The definition of these attacks takes into account control dependencies ignored by
taint-tracking mechanisms (Section 4.2.8).
3
4. Surprisingly, every application that always copies some untrusted input verbatim
into an (SQL◦) output program is vulnerable to CIAOs (Section 5.1). This result
implies that sound static mechanisms for detecting CIAOs must disallow all such
applications, conservatively ruling out a large class of applications in practice. The
proof of this result (in Section 5.1) is constructive; the proof defines inputs that will
successfully attack any application that verbatim copies some untrusted input into
the output program. Although the proof is tailored to SQL◦, the proof techniques
are general and applicable to other languages.
5. Similarly, applications that always copy some untrusted input verbatim into an
(SQL◦) output program are vulnerable to code-interference attacks (Section 5.1).
6. Neither static nor black-box analysis of applications can precisely detect CIAOs.
(Section 5.2)
7. Precisely detecting CIAOs requires white-box, runtime-monitoring mechanisms. Un-
der reasonable assumptions, such mechanisms can detect CIAOs in output programs
of size n in O(n) time and space. However, there are obstacles that make it difficult
to implement such mechanisms in practice. (Sections 5.3–5.4).
After presenting these results in Chapters 2–5, Chapter 6 concludes.
The text of this thesis is taken from [9].
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CHAPTER 2
RELATED WORK
Conventionally, CIAOs are considered to occur whenever an application’s input alters
the intended syntactic structure of its output program. Bisht, Madhusudan, and Venkata-
krishnan call this “a well-agreed principle in other works on detecting SQL injection” [7].
Indeed, this definition has appeared in many documents: [10, 11, 12, 5, 13, 14, 6, 15, 16,
17, 7, 18]. Although a few papers define CIAOs in other ways (e.g., CIAOs occur exactly
when keywords or operators get injected, including apostrophes used to form string val-
ues in SQL [19, 20], or when injected strings span multiple tokens [21]), the conventional
definition dominates the literature.
However, the conventional definition of CIAOs has inherent problems: some CIAOs
do not alter the syntactic structures of output programs, while some non-CIAOs do. To
illustrate these problems, Sections 2.1 and 2.2 discuss the conventional definitions of CIAOs
used by SqlCheck [5, 6] and Candid [14, 7]. As far as we’re aware, these are the only
existing formal definitions of CIAOs.
2.1 CIAOs in SqlCheck
SqlCheck considers the intended syntactic structure of an output program to be
any parse tree in which each injected input is the complete derivation of one terminal
or nonterminal. For example, parsing the output program SELECT balance FROM acct
WHERE password=‘’ OR 1=1 - -’ produces a parse tree in which the injected symbols
’ OR 1=1 - - are not the complete sequence of leaves for a single terminal or nontermi-
nal ancestor; SqlCheck therefore recognizes this CIAO.
However, some of what SqlCheck considers intended (i.e., non-attack) structures are
actually attacks. For example, parsing the output program SELECT balance FROM acct
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WHERE pin=exit() produces a tree in which the input symbols exit() are the complete
sequence of leaves for a single nonterminal (function-call1) ancestor. Hence, SqlCheck
does not recognize this CIAO as an attack. Similarly, an output program of the form
...WHERE flag=1000>GLOBAL wouldn’t be recognized as an attack, despite the injection
of a greater-than operator (which may allow an attacker to efficiently extract the value of
the GLOBAL variable, by performing a binary search over its range). Although SqlCheck
allows policy engineers to specify a set of terminal and nonterminal ancestors that inputs
may derive from—so engineers could disallow inputs derived as function-call and com-
parison expressions—it’s unclear how an engineer would know exactly which ancestors to
allow derivations from. Moreover, engineers may wish to sometimes allow, and sometimes
disallow, inputs to derive from particular terminals and nonterminals (as illustrated in Sec-
tion 3.3), which is impossible in SqlCheck.
Conversely, some of what SqlCheck considers unintended (i.e., attack) structures are
actually not attacks. For example, an application might input two strings, a file name
f and a file extension e, and concatenate them to generate the program SELECT * FROM
properties WHERE filename=‘f.e’. Although the user has injected no code, SqlCheck
flags this output as a CIAO because the user’s inputs are not complete sequences of leaves
for a single terminal or nonterminal ancestor. In this case, the immediate ancestor of the
user’s inputs would (assuming a typical grammar) be a string literal, but neither of the user’s
inputs form a complete string literal—they’re missing the dot and single-quote symbols.
TheCandid papers describe other, lower-level problems with SqlCheck’s definitions [14,
7].
2.2 CIAOs in Candid
Candid considers the intended syntactic structure of an output program, generated
by running application A on input I, to be whatever syntactic structure is present in the
output of A on input VR(I). Here VR is a (valid representation) function that converts
any input I into an input I ′ known to (1) be valid (i.e., non-CIAO-inducing) and (2) cause
1All major SQL implementations we are familiar with allow statements to call functions, including
administrator-defined functions [22, 23, 24].
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A to follow the same control-flow path as it would on input I. Candid begins by assuming
this VR function exists, while acknowledging that it does not; in this basic case, Candid
defines a CIAO to occur when A’s output on input I has a different syntactic structure
from A’s output on input VR(I).
Besides the nonexistence of function VR, there are some problems with this definition
of CIAOs. First, the definition is circular; CIAOs are defined in terms of VR, which itself
is assumed to output non-CIAO-inducing inputs (i.e., the definition of CIAOs relies on the
definition of VR, which relies on the definition of CIAOs). Second, the definition assumes
that multiple valid syntactic structures cannot exist. For example, suppose VR(‘,’)=aaa
and application A on input ‘,’ outputs SELECT * FROM t WHERE name IN (‘a’,‘b’),
while A on input aaa executes in the same way to output SELECT * FROM t WHERE name IN
(‘aaaab’). Both of these outputs are valid SQL programs, yet the programs have different
syntactic structures (a two-element list versus a single-element list), and neither exhibits
a CIAO (in no case has code been injected; only values, which take no steps dynamically,
have been injected). Candid would classify the non-CIAO input of ‘,’ as an attack in this
case.
To deal with the nonexistence of function VR, Candid attempts to approximate VR
by defining VR(I) to be 1 when I is an integer and a|I| when I is a string (where a|I| is a
sequence of a’s having the same length as I). Supplying a concrete definition of VR resolves
the circularity problem in Candid’s basic definition of CIAOs, but it doesn’t resolve the
second problem described in the previous paragraph (that multiple valid syntactic structures
may exist).
Moreover, Candid’s approximation of VR creates new problems:
1. The approximation incorrectly assumes a string of a’s or a 1 could never be attack
inputs. An application could inject an input a or 1 into an output program as part
of a function call, field selection, or even keyword (e.g., and), all of which could
be CIAOs. For example, suppose an application outputs a constant string, echoes
its input, and then outputs parentheses; on input exit it outputs the program
...pin=exit(). Candid would not recognize this CIAO because the application
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outputs ...pin=aaaa() on input aaaa, which has the same syntactic structure as
the ...pin=exit() output. The problem here is that aaaa is actually an attack
input for this application.
2. The approximation may also cause benign inputs to be detected as attacks. For
example, suppose an application outputs SELECT * FROM t WHERE flag=TRUE on
input TRUE, and follows the same control-flow path to output SELECT * FROM t
WHERE flag=aaaa on input VR(TRUE)=aaaa. Because these two output programs
have different syntactic structures (a boolean literal versus a variable identifier),
Candid would flag the input TRUE as an attack, even though the user has injected
no code.
3. The approximation can also break applications, as discussed in [7]. To illustrate
this problem, let’s consider the application if(input<2) then restart() else
output(1/(input - 1)). Candid cannot in general operate on this application
because it evaluates applications on both actual (I) and candidate (VR(I)) inputs,
while following the control-flow path required to evaluate the actual input. In this
case, whenever the application’s actual input is greater than one, Candid will try
to evaluate 1/(input-1) on the candidate input 1, which causes the application to
halt with a divide-by-zero error, despite there being no errors in Candid’s absence.
It could be argued that the example applications in the bullets above would be uncom-
mon in practice. But limiting the definition of CIAOs to common applications obligates us
to define what makes an application common, so we can test whether a given application
is “common” enough for the definition of CIAOs to apply. Even then, one couldn’t say
anything about CIAOs in uncommon applications.
2.3 Related-work Summary
CIAOs cannot be said to occur when an application’s output program has an altered
syntactic structure.
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1. CIAOs can occur without altering the syntactic structure of output programs (e.g.,
by injecting exit() or 1000>GLOBAL in SqlCheck, or exit in Candid).
2. Non-CIAOs can occur while altering the syntactic structure of output programs
(e.g., by injecting file name f and extension e in SqlCheck, or TRUE in Candid).
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CHAPTER 3
PARTITIONING PROGRAM SYMBOLS INTO CODE AND NONCODE
This section begins building a new definition of CIAOs. Because CIAOs occur when code
symbols get injected into output programs, the question of which output-program symbols
constitute code is key to defining CIAOs. This section addresses that question and defines
how to separate code from noncode. (The discussion is limited to the context of CIAOs; in
other contexts it makes sense to consider entire output programs as “code”.)
3.1 Overview of Partitioning Technique
Let’s begin by defining what is not code, rather than what is. This thesis considers
noncode to be the closed values in a programming language. Values are valid but oper-
ationally irreducible terms (i.e., normal forms) [25, 26]. Values can be thought of as the
“fully evaluated” computations in a programming language, typically including standalone
string and integer literals, pointers, objects, lists and tuples of other values, etc. Values are
closed when they contain no free variables; open values have free variables (e.g., a tuple
value like (4,x) and standalone variables are open values).
Closed values are fully evaluated, dynamically passive constructs, which by themselves
cause no dynamic computation to occur. On the other hand, because nonvalues and open
values are not part of these passive terms, they are used to help specify dynamically active
computation and therefore constitute code (in the case of open values, the dynamic activity
specified by a free variable is a substitution operation, which substitutes a term for the free
variable at runtime). Injecting symbols that only form closed values into an output program
therefore cannot be considered a CIAO—only irreducible, dynamically passive terms (i.e.,
“noncode”) will have been introduced. CIAOs occur when untrusted inputs get used outside
of closed values in output programs.
10
3.2 Formal Assumptions and Definitions
An application vulnerable to CIAOs outputs programs in some language L (e.g., SQL)
having finite concrete-syntax alphabet ΣL (e.g., the set of printable ASCII characters). An
output program, which we call an L-program, is a finite sequence of ΣL symbols that form
an element of L.
Definition 1. For all languages L with alphabet ΣL (i.e., L ⊆ Σ∗L), an L-program is an
element of L.
Additional definitions will rely on the following assumptions and notational conventions:
1. The length of program p is denoted as |p| (so when p = σ1σ2..σn, where each σ is a
program symbol in ΣL, we have |p| = n).
2. The ith symbol in program p is denoted as p[i].
3. Well-defined functions exist for computing free variables in all output-program lan-
guages under consideration. Function FV L(p, l, h) takes an L-program p = σ1σ2..σn,
a low symbol number l ∈ {1..n}, and a high symbol number h ∈ {l..n} and returns
the set of variables that are free in the shortest term in p that contains all of the
symbols σl..σh.
4. Well-defined functions also exist for testing whether terms are values in all output-
program languages under consideration. Predicate V alL(p, l, h) is true iff the short-
est term that contains the lth to hth symbols in L-program p is a value.
When the output language L is clear from context, we’ll omit it as a subscript on FV L and
V alL functions.
We now formalize Section 3.1’s intuition of noncode program symbols. We use the
predicate NCV to indicate whether symbols in an L-program form a noncode value. NCV
is true for an L-program p and low and high program-symbol numbers l and h iff the shortest
term containing the lth to hth symbols in p is a closed value.
Definition 2. For all languages L, predicate NCV (p, l, h) over L×{1..|p|}×{l..|p|} is true
iff FV (p, l, h) = ∅ and V al(p, l, h).
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Code symbols are those that cannot possibly be part of any noncode value. When p[i]
is code (where p is an output program), we write Code(p, i).
Definition 3. For all L-programs p = σ1σ2..σn and position numbers i ∈ {1..|p|}, Code(p, i)
is true iff for all low and high symbol-position numbers l ∈ {1..i} and h ∈ {i..|p|}, ¬NCV (p, l, h).
3.3 Example Separation of Code from Noncode
The remainder of this section illustrates Definition 3 in the context of SQL◦ (SQL
Diminished), an idealized SQL-style language inspired by the MSDN SQL Minimum Gram-
mar [27]. Figure 3.1 presents SQL◦’s syntax, which makes several assumptions:
1. Full SQL◦ programs are valid statements.
2. Operators in SQL◦ have standard precedence and associativity.
3. A set of (administrator-defined and/or standard-library) parameterless functions
exists, and SQL◦ expressions (i.e., exprs) can invoke these functions with the ID()
syntax (where ID is an identifier, in this case a function name). Such function calls
are possible in typical SQL implementations [28, 22, 23, 24].
4. Similarly, a set of (administrator-defined and/or standard) variables exists, and
variable identifiers are valid SQL◦ expressions.
5. Comments in SQL◦ begin with - - and continue to the first newline.
6. String literals in SQL◦ have the same escape sequence as string literals in full SQL
(i.e., a double apostrophe represents a single apostrophe). Also as in full SQL,
apostrophe directions are irrelevant in SQL◦, though we use directed apostrophes
in this thesis for clarity.
Values in SQL◦ are the last six terms listed in Figure 3.1 for category expr (i.e., from
INT LITERAL to NULL). Intuitively, the values in a typed programming language are normally
all the fully evaluated terms of each type in the language. SQL◦ has types for integers (INT),
strings having a given size (CHAR(INT LITERAL)), booleans (BOOL), and floats having a given
precision (FLOAT(INT LITERAL)), so its values are the fully evaluated terms of each of these
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statement ::= CREATE TABLE ID ( id type list )
| DELETE FROM ID w option
| DROP TABLE ID
| INSERT INTO ID vals
| SELECT s list FROM ID w option
id type list ::= ID type | id type list , ID type
type ::= INT | CHAR ( INT LITERAL ) | BOOL
| FLOAT ( INT LITERAL )
w option ::= ε | WHERE expr
expr ::= expr op expr | NOT expr | ( expr )
| expr IS NULL | ID | ID ( )
| INT LITERAL | STR LITERAL | TRUE
| FALSE | FLOAT LITERAL | NULL
op ::= OR | AND | < | > | = | + | ∗
vals ::= VALUES ( e list )
| SELECT s list FROM ID w option
e list ::= expr | e list , expr
s list ::= ∗ | i list
i list ::= ID | i list , ID
Figure 3.1: Syntax of SQL◦.
types—including integer literals, string literals, the true and false keywords, and floating-
point literals. Finally, NULL is a fully evaluated term of any type, also a value.
Given that values in SQL◦ are exactly the last six terms listed as exprs in Figure 3.1,
Definitions 2 and 3 imply that Code(p, i) holds iff, after parsing program p, p[i] is not part of
a nonterminal categorized as one of these six kinds of exprs. Noncode symbols are those in
closed values; all others are code. This definition also works when partitioning whitespace
and comment symbols: no symbol involved in whitespace or comments can possibly be
within a value (all values in SQL◦ are single tokens), so whitespace and comment symbols
are code.1
1It may also be reasonable to partition lexer-removed symbols (typically whitespace and comments) into
code and noncode in other ways. For example, one might consider lexer-removed symbols code iff their
existence affects the sequence of tokens in the output program.
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Table 3.1: A comparison of definitions for partitioning code and noncode. Column numbers
refer to the example output programs enumerated in Section 3.3, row names indicate parti-
tioning techniques, and cells specify whether any of the underlined symbols are considered
code.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
This thesis Y Y Y N Y Y N Y Y Y N
SqlCheck [5] Y N N Y N N N N N N N
Candid [7] Y Y Y N N N Y N N N Y
WASP [20], Nguyen-Tuong et al. [19] Y Y Y N N N N N N N Y
Xu et al. [21] Y Y Y N N N N N N N N
A few observations about this definition of code in SQL◦:
1. Parsing is necessary to determine whether a symbol is code. For example, an integer
literal is code when used in a type specification, but noncode when used as an
expression.
2. Conventional definitions of CIAOs are incompatible with the definition of code in
SQL◦. For example, there exists no set of terminals and nonterminals in Fig-
ure 3.1 that exactly derive noncode symbols (exprs may contain code, and even
INT LITERALs may be code depending on the context); hence, our definition of code
is inexpressible with SqlCheck [5].
3. Code and noncode can’t be partitioned by considering noncode to be literals. Some
literals are code (e.g., an integer in a type) and other are not (e.g., an integer
expression). Although all nonliterals (e.g., a CREATE keyword) are code in SQL◦,
languages with more sophisticated values (e.g., lists) may have nonliteral, noncode
symbols (e.g., commas between elements of a list value).
4. Code and noncode also can’t be partitioned by considering code to be keywords and
operators. Some keywords are code (e.g., CREATE) and others are not (e.g., TRUE).
Some symbols that are neither keywords nor operators are code (e.g., function-name
IDs) and others are not (e.g., literals).
Next, let’s consider several example output programs, beginning with the examples from
Sections 2.1 and 2.2, to see how the new definitions partition injected symbols.
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1. SELECT balance FROM acct WHERE password=‘’ OR 1=1 - -’ The injected OR, =,
and - - (and spaces) are code, so a CIAO has occurred.
2. SELECT balance FROM acct WHERE pin= exit() All the injected symbols are code,
so a CIAO has occurred.
3. ...WHERE flag=1000>GLOBAL The injected > is code, so a CIAO has occurred.
4. SELECT * FROM properties WHERE filename=‘f.e’ No injected symbols are code,
so a CIAO has not occurred.
5. ...pin=exit() All the injected symbols are code, so a CIAO has occurred.
6. ...pin=aaaa() Again, all the injected symbols are code, so a CIAO has occurred.
7. SELECT * FROM t WHERE flag=TRUE No injected symbols are code, so a CIAO
has not occurred.
8. SELECT * FROM t WHERE flag=aaaa An open expression (which causes a substi-
tution operation to be performed at runtime) was injected, so a CIAO has occurred.
9. SELECT * FROM t WHERE password=password Again, an open expression (which
causes a substitution operation to be performed at runtime) was injected, so a CIAO
has occurred.
10. CREATE TABLE t (name CHAR(40)) All the injected symbols are code, so a CIAO
has occurred.
11. SELECT * FROM t WHERE name=‘x’ No injected symbols are code, so a CIAO has
not occurred.
In all of these cases, the partitioning avoids the problems with conventional CIAO definitions
described in Chapter 2 and matches our intuition about which program symbols are code
(and consequently cause a CIAO if injected).
Table 3.1 compares this thesis’s partitioning of the example output programs enumerated
above with the partitionings used in previous work. The only scenarios in which we believe
15
previous definitions would be favored over this thesis’s definitions are when the assumptions
made by this thesis’s definitions cannot be satisfied easily, that is, when it’s difficult to define
the set of closed values in the output-program language.
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CHAPTER 4
DEFINITION OF CIAOS
Defining CIAOs requires subdefinitions of code and injection. At this point code has
been defined; it is time to consider what it means for an attacker to inject symbols into
an output program. Intuitively, injected symbols are the ones that propagate unmodified
from an untrusted input source to the output program. A CIAO occurs when at least one
untrusted input symbol propagates into, and gets used as code in, an output program.
To know when input symbols have propagated, possibly through copy operations, to
output programs, one could taint all untrusted inputs to applications and have those appli-
cations transparently propagate taints through copy operations (Section 4.2 will consider
propagating taints through other operations as well). Then output programs could be
tested to determine whether any of their tainted symbols are used as code. Tracking taints
to determine which output-program symbols derive from untrusted inputs is a well-studied
technique (e.g., [11, 21, 20, 19, 29]).
4.1 Formal Assumptions and Definitions
As in earlier sections, underlines will represent tainted symbols (i.e., those injected from
untrusted sources). As a technicality, if some element of Σ is already underlined then all
underlines in this thesis may need to be replaced with some other annotation not present on
any Σ symbol. Then, for all languages L with alphabet Σ, let L denote the same language
but with alphabet Σ, where Σ contains tainted and untainted versions of every symbol
in Σ. Thus, the tainted output language L contains exactly those programs in L, except
that programs in L can have symbols tainted in any way. The following three definitions
formalize these ideas.
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Definition 4. For all alphabets Σ, the tainted-symbol alphabet Σ is:
{σ | σ ∈ Σ ∨ (∃σ′ ∈ Σ : σ = σ′)}.
Definition 5. For all alphabets Σ and symbols σ ∈ Σ, the predicate tainted(σ) is true iff
σ 6∈ Σ.
Definition 6. For all languages L with alphabet Σ, the tainted output language L with
alphabet Σ is:
{σ1..σn | ∃σ′1..σ′n ∈ L : ∀i ∈ {1..n} : (σi=σ′i ∨ σi=σ′i)}
Given a regular, non-taint-tracking application, which outputs L-programs, a taint-
tracking application, which outputs L-programs, is constructed by ensuring all the following.
1. All symbols input to the application from untrusted sources are marked tainted.
2. Taints propagate through all operations that copy or output symbols.
3. Besides inputting symbols from untrusted sources and copying and outputting al-
ready tainted symbols, there are no other ways to introduce tainted symbols.
4. Taints are invisible to the application; they have no effect on its execution.
The only assumption this thesis makes of applications is that they can be reasoned about
as taint-tracking applications obeying these four rules.
At last, CIAOs can be defined as occurring whenever an injected (i.e., tainted) symbol
in an application’s output is used as code.
Definition 7. A CIAO occurs exactly when a taint-tracking application outputs L-program
p = σ1..σn such that ∃i ∈ {1..n} : (tainted(σi) ∧ Code(p, i)).
4.2 Discussion of the CIAO Definition
There are several points of discussion related to Definition 7.
4.2.1 Syntactic versus Semantic Analysis
Contrary to previous work [5, 7], Definition 7 does not limit CIAO detection to syntactic
analysis. Although testing whether sequences of program symbols denote closed values
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typically requires only syntactic analysis (e.g., values are defined syntactically for SQL◦ in
Section 3.3), such testing could conceivably require stronger-than-syntactic analysis. For
example, semantic analysis may be required to determine whether the output programs
date:=1/1/11 and balance:=1/1/11 exhibit CIAOs in output-program languages with
slashes used in both date-literal and integer-division expressions.
4.2.2 Expected (Nonmalicious) CIAOs
Although CIAOs often constitute malicious use of an application, some application
programmers expect CIAOs to occur and don’t consider them malicious. For example:
1. A translator between programming languages may input an expression like x+y and
output a program containing the same expression or some code like r1:=r1+r2, with
the nonvalue + symbol having been injected. This is not a problem, and authors
of programming-language translators would typically not consider CIAOs on their
translators harmful.
2. Tools like phpMyAdmin provide interfaces for remote users to enter MySQL pro-
grams and then have those programs output for other systems to execute [30].
3. Applications may check inputs before injecting them as code in output programs,
such as the application if(input=‘safeFunction’) then output(input+‘()’)
else raise badNameExn, or the application if(input.matches(‘Math.*’)) then
output(input+‘()’) else raise badNameExn. Programmers of these applica-
tions may not consider CIAOs of checked inputs to be malicious (though it may
nonetheless be desirable to detect CIAOs in such programs, for example, to prevent
the latter application from outputing Math.pi+exit()).
We believe that whether an act is “malicious” or an “attack” or against a programmer’s
“expectations” or “intentions” is subjective. The only artifact we can examine is the pro-
grammer’s code, but that code may not capture the programmer’s intentions. Definition 7
therefore does not depend on subjective factors like programmers’ intentions; CIAOs are
defined as occurring whenever an application injects untrusted input into the code of an out-
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put program, regardless of whether the application programmer would consider the CIAOs
malicious.
To make an analogy to memory safety, there are mechanisms to prevent memory-safety
violations, e.g., type checkers. However, some memory-safety violations are not harmful and
may be fully intended by programmers. For example, a programmer with knowledge of how
integers and floats are encoded may find that writing an arbitrary float value to integer-
type memory does exactly what s/he wants very efficiently. As another example, one of
the difficulties encountered by “Safe C” projects is that some memory-safety violations are
actually intentional and clever optimizations [31, 32, 33].
Definitions of memory-safety violations don’t (as far as we’re aware) take into account
programmer intentions; mechanisms for preventing memory-safety violations disregard pro-
grammer intentions and prevent all memory-safety violations, regardless of whether a pro-
grammer considers some particular violation malicious. Analogously, Definition 7, unlike
the conventional definitions of CIAOs used by previous work, sidesteps the subjective ques-
tions of whether output programs are intended or malicious. Definition 7 just focuses on
detecting whether code has been injected into output programs.
4.2.3 Non-CIAO Injection Attacks
Some injection attacks on output programs are not code-injection attacks on output
programs. For instance, consider the output program SELECT balance FROM acct WHERE
password = TRUE. Here, a type error will occur (assuming that password is not of boolean
type), potentially causing unexpected failures. Although this output program contains
symbols that may have been injected with malicious intent, those symbols are part of a
closed value and are therefore not used as code. Because code has not been injected, the
output program does not exhibit a CIAO according to Definition 7.
4.2.4 Function Values
Functions are first-class values in many languages, and it may seem strange to allow
arbitrary closed function values to be injected into output programs. However, a function
value is dynamically passive; a function value only activates when operated upon, by ap-
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plying the function. Hence, injecting a function value does not constitute a CIAO, but
injecting a function application does (assuming the injected application is not within some
other closed value, such as an outer lambda term).
4.2.5 Alternate-encoding and Second-order Attacks
Definition 7 has no problem with “alternate-encoding attacks”. Alternate encodings al-
low attackers to mask injected code, for example, by inputting
exec(char(0x73687574646f776e)) instead of a direct SHUTDOWN command [20]. Defini-
tion 7 detects such attacks because the injected function calls are recognized as code. Def-
inition 7 also detects “second-order injection attacks” (where an attacker stores some code
in a database that an application later retrieves and injects into its output [34, 35]), as
long as the database input to the application is considered untrusted (or, as a more pre-
cise alternative, the database could store flags indicating which of its entries’ symbols are
tainted).
4.2.6 Defining “Injection”
Finally, Definition 7 interprets “injection” as meaning that symbols have been directly
copied from input to output. For example, loading a tainted symbol from memory into a
register would taint that register’s value, but adding two tainted integers involves no direct
copying and therefore produces an untainted result. Thus, Definition 7 does not consider
CIAOs to occur when applications output programs whose code symbols are “massaged”
versions of untrusted inputs—the massaging (i.e., noncopy manipulation) prevents the input
symbols from being considered injected. Intuitively, an application like output(input()+1)
may input a 1 from an untrusted user and then output the program 2. In this case it seems
inaccurate to say that the user “injected” the 2, given that the user never entered a 2, and the
application produced the 2 by actively transforming its input. If anything, the application
and user have collaborated to produce the 2 that got output. One could consider this
example demonstrative of a more general class of attacks: data-dependency-based CIAOs.
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4.2.7 Data-dependency-based CIAOs
Following this train of thought leads us to define data-dependency-based CIAOs in ex-
actly the same way as regular CIAOs (which henceforth will also be called copy-based
CIAOs), except that for data-dependency-based CIAOs we broaden taint propagation to
occur on all data operations, not just copies and outputs. That is, for any data depen-
dency in which the value of a symbol σ depends on the value of at least one tainted
symbol, σ must also be tainted. In the example above, we would taint the 2 produced
by adding a tainted 1 with an untainted 1. As a better example, consider the application
output(toUpper(input())+‘()’), which outputs EXIT() after inputting exit. Defini-
tion 7 does not consider this exit input to be a copy-based CIAO because with copy-based
tainting, the output is just EXIT(), with no symbols tainted/underlined. However, the exit
input is a data-dependency-based CIAO because with data-dependency-based tainting, the
output is EXIT(). Note that every copy-based CIAO is also a data-dependency-based CIAO.
In many cases, such as the all-caps-function-name application above, it may be helpful
to detect and prevent data-dependency-based CIAOs. In other cases, data-dependency-
based-CIAOs may be expected, so system administrators may not find it helpful for them
to be caught and flagged (similar to expected copy-based CIAOs, discussed above). For
example, an application for managing online courses might hash an input student number
to obtain a discussion-group number g and then output a program like SELECT numPosts
FROM group g where threadNum=4. Assuming g is obtained through noncopy operations
on the untrusted student-number input, this application exhibits a non-copy-based, data-
dependency-based CIAO. But the application programmers and system administrators
would likely not consider this data-dependency-based CIAO malicious.
4.2.8 Code-interference Attacks
Broadening taint propagation further, one might consider taints to propagate even
through control dependencies. To illustrate, let’s consider the following application, which
is semantically equivalent to the input-echoing application output(input()) and performs
what [7] calls a “conditional copy”.
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while(there are more input symbols) {
switch(next input symbol) {
case ‘a’ : output(‘a’); break;
case ‘b’ : output(‘b’); break;
...
}
}
This switch-based application is invulnerable to (copy-based and data-dependency-based)
CIAOs because there are no data dependencies between input and output symbols—every
symbol output is a constant hardcoded into the application source code. On the other hand,
the semantically equivalent input-echoing application is vulnerable to (copy-based and data-
dependency-based) CIAOs because it directly copies input symbols into the output. These
are reasonable consequences of only dealing with code-injection attacks; CIAOs only occur
when code symbols in output programs directly depend on untrusted input.
Still, it may be desirable to prevent applications from behaving as the switch-based
application above does, and more generally, to prevent untrusted inputs from interfering
at all (even indirectly, through control dependencies) with the code symbols an application
outputs. To do so, we propose studying CIntAOs—code-interference attacks on outputs.
The switch-based application above is vulnerable to CIntAOs because its input can interfere
with the code symbols that get output.
An application is vulnerable to CIntAOs whenever inputs differing in untrusted symbols
can cause the application to output programs differing in code symbols. In other words,
applications invulnerable to CIntAOs must, when given the same trusted inputs, always
output programs containing the same code symbols.
Definition 8. A CIntAO occurs exactly when:
1. Application A, on trusted and untrusted input sequences T∈Σ∗ and U∈Σ∗, outputs
L-program p.
2. There exists another untrusted input sequence U ′∈Σ∗ such that:
23
(a) On T and U ′, A outputs L-program p′.
(b) The subsequence of code symbols in p is not equal to the subsequence of code
symbols in p′.
The switch-based application above is invulnerable to CIAOs but vulnerable to CIntAOs.
It also is possible for applications to be invulnerable to CIntAOs but vulnerable to CIAOs.
For example, the application if input=‘1+1’ then output(input) else output(‘1+1’)
exhibits a CIAO on input ‘1+1’ but cannot exhibit a CIntAO because there is no way to
change the subsequence of code symbols in the output program by changing the untrusted
input.
Although it may sometimes be desirable to detect CIntAOs, the strictness with which
they’re defined causes many reasonable applications, which are free of CIAOs, to exhibit
CIntAOs. For example, an application could accept some untrusted input indicating which
currency to output an account balance in; if the desired currency is not the default, the
application might output some code to multiply the fetched balance by a conversion rate.
This application exhibits neither data-dependency-based nor copy-based CIAOs because
the code symbols it outputs (e.g., the multiplication symbol) are not data-dependent on
the input currency. However, this application does exhibit CIntAOs because the input
currency affects (through a control dependency) the code that gets output (i.e., whether or
not a multiplication gets included in the output program). Hence, this example application
illustrates that CIntAOs, like copy- and data-dependency-based CIAOs, may be expected
and not considered malicious for some applications.
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CHAPTER 5
IMPLICATIONS OF THE DEFINITION OF CIAOS
Analyzing the previous sections’ definitions provides insight into the pervasiveness of
CIAO and CIntAO vulnerabilities, as well as various mechanisms’ effectiveness at mitigating
CIAOs.
5.1 Pervasiveness of CIAO and CIntAO Vulnerabilities
We’ve been surprised to find that any application that always blindly copies some un-
trusted input verbatim into its SQL◦ output is vulnerable to a (copy-based) CIAO at run-
time. Theorem 9 formalizes this result; it states that if an application always includes an
untrusted input (im) verbatim in its output (without even inspecting that input), and the
same application has some input (v1, .., vn) for which it outputs a valid SQL
◦ program, then
there exists a way to construct the untrusted input (am) such that the application’s output
will contain an injected code symbol. The proof is constructive; it shows how to inject code
into any such application using a detailed case analysis of the kind of value the untrusted
input (vm) gets injected into. Although the proof is tailored to SQL
◦, the proof techniques
are general.
Theorem 9. For all n-ary functions A and (n-1)-ary functions A′ and A′′, if ∀i1, .., in :
A(i1, .., in) = A
′(i1, .., im−1, im+1, .., in)imA′′(i1, .., im−1, im+1, .., in), where 1 ≤ m ≤ n and
∃v1, .., vn : (vm ∈ Σ+SQL◦ ∧ A(v1, .., vn) ∈ SQL◦), then ∃a1, .., an : A(a1, .., an) ∈ SQL◦ and
A(a1, .., an) exhibits a (copy-based) CIAO.
Proof. By assumption, ∃v1, .., vn : A(v1, .., vn) ∈ SQL◦. First, if A(v1, .., vn) exhibits a
CIAO, then simply set a1, .., an to v1, .., vn. On the other hand, if A(v1, .., vn) does not
exhibit a CIAO, then, by the definition of CIAOs, vm must be a substring of a value, because
25
vm is not empty and appears verbatim in the output of A(v1, .., vn). Note that changing the
untrusted vm input to am, without changing any of the other n− 1 inputs, will cause A to
output A′(v1, .., vm−1, vm+1, .., vn)amA′′(v1, .., vm−1, vm+1, .., vn), that is, the same output
program but with am instead of vm. We will show that no matter the type of the value
that vm is a substring of, there exists an am that will cause A(v1, .., vm−1, am, vm+1, .., vn)
to exhibit a (copy-based) CIAO but still remain valid.
First, we handle the case of string literals.
am = if (the first character of vm is not an apostrophe or is the first apostrophe of a
double-apostrophe escape sequence) then ’ + GLOBAL + ‘vm else
‘ ’ + GLOBAL + vm
Examples:
1. ‘fname’ becomes ‘f’ + GLOBAL + ‘name’.
2. ‘ ‘ ’ ’ becomes ‘ ’ + GLOBAL + ‘ ‘ ’ ’.
3. ‘fname’ becomes ‘ ’ + GLOBAL + ‘fname’.
Let sm denote the string literal that vm is a substring of. If vm does not start sm
(which could happen if vm begins with the first apostrophe of a double-apostrophe escape
sequence), then the string literal must have been started earlier, as A(v1, .., vn) ∈ SQL◦. In
this case, our construction of am terminates the string literal that has been started, inserts
a code symbol (the concatenation operator), a global variable, another code symbol, and
then begins a second string literal. If vm terminated sm, then this new string literal will
also be terminated by vm. If vm did not terminate sm, then it must have been terminated
later, again because A(v1, .., vn) ∈ SQL◦. As a result, this second string literal will also
be terminated later. On the other hand, if vm did start sm (or is the second apostrophe
of a double-apostrophe escape sequence), then our construction creates an empty string
literal (or finishes the escape sequence and terminates the literal) and concatenates a global
variable and then concatenates another second string literal started by vm. Again, we know
that this second string literal will be terminated, either by vm or the characters following it,
for the same reasons as earlier. Thus, our construction of am causes sm, when am has been
26
substituted for vm, to be parsed as s
′+GLOBAL+s′′, where s′ and s′′ are both valid string
literals. Note that expr OP expr is a valid expr, and as long as GLOBAL is of type string,
s′+GLOBAL+s′′ will be of the same type as sm. As any expr can by replaced by another
expr of the same type, the program will remain valid after the substitution of am for vm.
As am contains a code symbol (i.e. 2 concatenation operators, as well as whitespace), a
CIAO is exhibited.
Next, we handle the case of integer and float literals.
am = vm1*exit()*2
Examples:
1. -100 becomes -1 * exit() * 2100.
2. 11E34 becomes 11E1 * exit() *234.
This construction works for similar reasons as the STRING LITERAL case above; In ad-
dition to the 2 multiplication code symbols, this construction also has a function call.
Finally, we handle the TRUE, FALSE, and NULL cases.
Let IDm denote the keyword that vm is a substring of; hence IDm can be written
as IDm−vmIDm+ (where IDm− and IDm+ are in Σ∗SQL◦). If IDm has a boolean type,
then let OP be OR and let SUB be 1000 > GLOBAL. Otherwise, let OP be +, and let
SUB be exit() if IDm has an integer or float type, or GLOBAL otherwise. Then let
am = vmIDm+ OP SUB OP IDm−vm.
Examples:
1. FALSE becomes FALSE OR 1000> GLOBAL OR FALSE.
2. NULL + 3 becomes NULL + exit() + NULL + 3.
By assumption, vm is a substring of a keyword IDm. We assumed earlier thatA(v1, .., vn) ∈
SQL◦, so IDm must be a valid keyword. We also know that in A(v1, .., vn), vm is preceded
by IDm− and followed by IDm+. We construct am such that it finishes the identifier or
keyword started by the existing IDm−, inserts a code symbol depending on the type of
IDm, conducts an attack, then inserts another code symbol, and begins a new identifier or
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keyword to be finished by the existing IDm+. As a result, where originally the program
used IDm as an expr, the modified program uses IDm OP SUB OP IDm. Furthermore,
the type of the expr remains unchanged, as if IDm has a boolean type, then OP will be
OR, and a boolean OR’d with a boolean is a boolean. If IDm has a float or integer type,
then OP will be the arithmetic operator +, which will return either a float or an integer
type. If IDm has a string type, then the + operator denotes concatenation, and two stings
concatenated with each other form a string. Note that the only keyword that is a value and
can have a type of int, float, or string is NULL, as it can assume any type.
Note that a CIAO has already occurred when NULL is used in expr IS NULL, because
NULL is only a value when parsed as an entire expr.
Furthermore, any application that verbatim copies untrusted input into the (SQL◦)
output program is either vulnerable to CIntAOs or can be made to output an invalid
program. Again, the proof is constructive; it shows how to create an untrusted input that
changes the sequence of code symbols in, or invalidates, the output program.
Theorem 10. For all n-ary functions A and (n-1)-ary functions A′ and A′′,
if ∀i1, .., in : A(i1, .., in) = A′(i1, .., im−1, im+1, .., in)imA′′(i1, .., im−1, im+1, .., in), where 1 ≤
m ≤ n and ∃v1, .., vn : (vm ∈ Σ+SQL◦∧A(v1, .., vn) ∈ SQL◦), then A either exhibits a CIntAO
or can be made to produce an invalid SQL◦ program.
Proof. Observe that every symbol in an SQL◦ program is either part of a value or not.
If vm contains a symbol recognized as part of a value, then the input can be modified
in the manner described in the proof of Theorem 9, and the sequence of code symbols
will be modified; by definition, A exhibits a CIntAO. On the other hand, if vm contains a
code symbol, then a different symbol can be provided. If the SQL◦ program is still valid,
then a CIntAO has occurred, as the sequence of code symbols has changed. If changing
the code symbol made the program invalid then the second condition of the implication is
satisfied.
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Given that (program-outputting) applications commonly copy some untrusted input
verbatim into the output, Theorems 9–10 show that vulnerabilities to CIAOs and CIntAOs
are pervasive.
5.2 Limitations of Static and Black-box Mechanisms to Detect CIAOs
Determining whether an application is vulnerable to CIAOs requires knowing which
input symbols propagate to the output program. This makes it undecidable to precisely
detect (both copy-based and data-dependency-based) CIAOs using static code analysis or
black-box analysis.
Theorem 11. There exists an application A, which inputs a string of symbols over alphabet
Σ and outputs L-programs, such that it is undecidable, when given only an input string
s ∈ Σ∗ and a (e.g., Turing-machine) encoding of A, to determine whether A exhibits a
(copy-based or data-dependency-based) CIAO on s.
Proof. Let A be an application that inputs a string s, executes subprogram p, and then
outputs s if s equals “1+1” but otherwise outputs just “1”. This A outputs programs
in any language having integers and addition. Also, A exhibits a (copy-based and data-
dependency-based) CIAO iff its subprogram p halts and its input s is “1+1”. Statically
determining whether A exhibits a CIAO on input “1+1” therefore reduces to the halting
problem.
Theorem 12. There exists an application A, which inputs a string of symbols over alphabet
Σ and outputs L-programs, such that it is impossible, when given only an input string s ∈ Σ∗
and the ability (i.e., an oracle) to predict the output of A on any input, to determine whether
A exhibits a (copy-based or data-dependency-based) CIAO on s. In other words, there exist
observationally equivalent applications A and A′ and a string s such that A(s) exhibits a
CIAO but A′(s) does not exhibit a CIAO.
Proof. Let A be the input-echoing application output(input) and A′ the conditional-copy
application from Section 4.2.8. Recall from Section 4.2.8 that A and A′ are observationally
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equivalent, A is vulnerable to CIAOs (e.g., on an input like 1+1), and A′ is invulnerable to
CIAOs.
Theorems 11–12 are interesting because they rule out certain classes of mechanisms from
being able to precisely detect CIAOs. Some of the mechanisms ruled out were previously
thought to precisely detect CIAOs; an example is SqlCheck’s black-box, “bracket”-based
tainting mechanism (in which untrusted inputs get surrounded by special characters, and
output symbols are considered tainted iff they’re surrounded by those characters) [5]. Al-
though previous work showed that SqlCheck’s tainting mechanism is flawed [7], Theo-
rems 11–12 are more general, in that they rule out entire classes of mechanisms from being
able to precisely detect CIAOs.
Of course, Theorems 11–12 don’t rule out static analysis and black-box mechanisms
as being useful for mitigating CIAOs. Although such mechanisms can’t detect CIAOs
precisely, they can detect CIAOs conservatively (i.e., soundly but not completely) with
no/low runtime overhead, while avoiding the many practical obstacles to monitoring taints
dynamically (some of which are described in Section 5.4).
However, sound static mechanisms for detecting CIAOs must be so conservative as to
reject a large class of common applications, which may limit their appeal. Recall that
Theorem 9 showed that all applications that copy some untrusted input verbatim into an
output program can be made to exhibit a CIAO at runtime. Hence, sound static mechanisms
for detecting CIAOs must reject all of this large class of common applications. (Similarly,
Theorem 10 implies that sound CIntAO-detecting static mechanisms must reject all such
applications as well.) Related work on static-analysis techniques for detecting CIAOs [36,
37, 38] appear to be consistent with this result; none seem to allow applications to copy
untrusted input verbatim into output programs. Having a formal definition of CIAOs
makes it possible to prove that this characteristic is mandatory for all sound, static, CIAO-
detecting mechanisms.
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Figure 5.1: Overview of a CIAO-preventing mechanism. Trusted components are shaded.
5.3 Design of Mechanisms for Precisely Detecting and Preventing CIAOs
Theorems 11–12 prove that precisely detecting CIAOs requires a dynamic white-box
mechanism. A high-level design of such a mechanism follows straightforwardly from the
definitions in Chapters 3–4.
A dynamic white-box mechanism can precisely detect and prevent CIAOs by:
1. tainting all symbols input to an application A from untrusted sources,
2. transparently tracking one taint bit per symbol,
3. propagating taints through exactly A’s copy and output operations (for copy-based
CIAOs) or all data operations (for data-dependency-based CIAOs),
4. intercepting A’s output programs, and
5. forbidding execution of output programs that contain at least one tainted symbol
used outside a value (i.e., as code).
Figure 5.1 illustrates such a mechanism.
Theorem 13. Assuming a mechanism M performs these operations on an application that
outputs programs in a language with decidable free-variable (FV ) and value (V al) functions,
it is decidable for M to precisely detect and prevent CIAOs.
Proof. Immediate by Definition 7 and the definitions of data-dependency CIAOs and mech-
anism M given above.
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Algorithm 5.2 directly implements this generic design of dynamic white-box mechanisms
for preventing CIAOs. The algorithm relies on auxiliary functions for (1) adding taint
tracking to applications, (2) signaling that untrusted inputs are tainted, (3) calculating the
set of free variables in a sequence of program symbols, and (4) deciding whether program
symbols constitute a value.
Input: Application A and inputs T , U (trusted, untrusted)
Ensure: A’s output is executed iff it doesn’t exhibit a CIAO
A′ ← AddTaintTracking(A)
Output← A′ (T , Taint(U))
for i← 1 to |Output| do
if tainted(Output[i]) then
IsCiao← true
for low ← 1 to i do
for high← i to |Output| do
if FV(Output, low, high) = ∅ and
Val(Output, low, high) then
IsCiao← false
end if
end for
end for
if IsCiao then
throw CiaoException
end if
end if
end for
Execute(Output)
Figure 5.2 A basic CIAO-preventing mechanism. This algorithm directly implements the
definition of CIAOs to determine whether or not the application’s output exhibits a CIAO.
Each of the three nested for loops in Algorithm 5.2 executes O(n) times, where n denotes
the size of the output program. Hence, if we ignore the complexities of the FV and V al
functions (which are dependent on the output-program language), the top-level for loop of
Algorithm 5.2 runs in O(n3) time. Assuming that the FV and V al functions run in time
linear in their input size, then, the top-level for loop of Algorithm 5.2 runs in O(n4) time.
The space required by the top-level for loop of Algorithm 5.2 consists of the i, low, and
high counters (each of size O(lg n)), the IsCiao flag (of size O(1)), and whatever space is
required to invoke and execute the FV and V al functions. Assuming that invoking and
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executing the FV and V al functions uses space linear in their input size, then, the top-level
for loop of Algorithm 5.2 uses O(n) space.
Input: Application A and inputs T , U (trusted, untrusted)
Ensure: A’s output is executed iff it doesn’t exhibit a CIAO
A′ ← AddTaintTracking(A)
Output← A′ (T , Taint(U))
tokens← run tokenize (Output)
on recognition of token t do
t.begin ← position of first symbol of t in Output
t.end ← position of last symbol of t in Output
end on
end run
run shift-reduce-parse (tokens)
on reducing by production N ::= s1 s2 . . . sn, where s1..sn is a closed value do
N .isVal ← true
clearTaints(list of pointers to s1, . . . , sn)
N .begin ← s1.begin
N .end ← sn.end
end on
on reducing by production N ::= s1 s2 . . . sn, where s1..sn is not a closed value do
N .isVal ← false
N .children ← list of pointers to s1..sn
N .begin ← s1.begin
N .end ← sn.end
end on
end run
for i← 1 to |Output| do
if tainted(Output[i]) then
throw CiaoException
end if
end for
Execute(Output)
Figure 5.3 An optimized CIAO-preventing mechanism (for applications whose output-
program language has an LR(k) grammar in which every closed value matches some syn-
tactic category).
5.3.1 Optimized CIAO-Preventing Mechanism
Algorithm 5.2 can be optimized to run in O(n) time and space, under the assump-
tion that the output-program language has an LR(k) grammar in which every closed value
matches some syntactic category (e.g., in SQL◦ every closed value matches the expr cate-
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gory). When output-program languages satisfy this assumption, Algorithm 5.2’s top-level
for loop can be replaced with a shift-reduce parse of the application’s output program.
When reducing a closed-value right-side R of a production to a nonterminal N , the parser
sets an isVal attribute for N and erases taints on all output-program symbols represented
by R (except for any symbols represented by nonterminals in R for which isVal has been
set—such symbols have already had their taints erased). After running this taint-erasing
parser, all output-program taints in closed values will have been erased, so a CIAO is
detected if and only if some tainted symbol remains in the output program.
Input: A sequence of pointers p1, . . . , pn to parse tree nodes.
Ensure: All symbols between the leftmost descendant of p1 and the rightmost descendant
of pn have their tainted attribute set to false.
function clearTaints (p1, . . . , pn) =
for i← 1 to n do
Current← dereference(pi)
if Current is a terminal then
for j ← Current.begin to Current.end do
Output[j].Tainted = false
end for
else if Current.isVal=false then
clearTaints(Current.children)
end if
if i < n then // clear tainted whitespace, if any
Next← dereference(pi+1)
for j ← Current.end to Next.begin do
Output[j].Tainted = false
end for
end if
end for
end function
Figure 5.4 The clearTaints function used by Algorithm 5.3.
The algorithm in Figure 5.3 presents pseudocode for this optimized CIAO-preventing
mechanism, which makes use of a clearTaints function that is defined in Figure 5.4.
The algorithm in Figure 5.3 relies on auxiliary functions for (1) adding taint tracking to
applications, (2) signaling that untrusted inputs are tainted, (3) tokenizing output programs,
and (4) shift-reduce parsing output programs.
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Theorem 14. The algorithm in Figure 5.3 runs in O(n) time and space.
Proof. The tokenization portion of the algorithm in Figure 5.3 runs in O(n) time and space
(where again n is the size of the application’s output program). A standard shift-reduce
parse of the output program, without the additional actions performed on reductions, runs
in O(n) time and space; the total number of right-hand-side-production symbols reduced
to nonterminals during the parse is O(n) [39]. Because the total number of right-hand-side-
production symbols reduced to nonterminals during the parse is O(n), all the non-taint-
clearing reduction actions in the algorithm in Figure 5.3 (i.e., N .isVal←true, N .begin ←
s1.begin, etc.) occur in O(n) total time and space. The for loop in the algorithm in
Figure 5.3 also runs in O(n) time and space, so the entire algorithm uses linear time and
space, in addition to the time and space used to clear taints.
To determine the total time and space used by taint-clearing operations, observe that
clearTaints is always initially invoked, in Algorithm 5.3’s run shift-reduce-parse block, on
symbols matching a nonterminal N such that N .isVal=true. During execution, clearTaints
may call itself recursively only on parse-tree-descendent nonterminals with false isVal
attributes. Because parsing is bottom-up, then, pointers to the same syntax-tree symbol
may never be passed as arguments to clearTaints more than once, and every output-program
taint may be cleared at most once (technically this result also relies on the facts that isVal
attributes are constant once set, taints can only be cleared by clearTaints, and clearTaints,
when called on pointers to symbols s1..sn, can only clear taints at output-program positions
s1.begin to sn.end). Also observe that, ignoring recursive clearTaints calls, each run of
clearTaints executes in time proportional to the number of pointers to nonterminals passed
as arguments plus the number of taints cleared. Then because (1) pointers to the same
syntax-tree symbol may never be passed as arguments to clearTaints more than once, (2) the
total number of nonterminals in the parse tree is O(n) [39], (3) every output-program taint
may be cleared at most once, and (4) each run of clearTaints executes in time proportional
to the number of pointers to nonterminals passed as arguments plus the number of taints
cleared, we have that the total time (and therefore space) used by all clearTaints operations
is O(n). Hence, the algorithm in Figure 5.3 block uses O(n) time and space, as required.
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5.4 Obstacles to Monitoring Taints in Practice
Many taint-monitoring mechanisms and frameworks exist for mitigating CIAOs (e.g., [19,
20, 11, 21, 29]). None separate code from noncode the way this thesis has, but one frame-
work, Dytan [29], which has not yet been publicly released, implements (for x86 applica-
tions) the taint-tracking functionality our definitions require. Hence, it appears possible
to use Dytan to precisely detect (copy-based and data-dependency-based) CIAOs in x86
applications (by ensuring that all operations in Section 5.3’s bulleted list are performed).
Even with powerful taint-monitoring frameworks like Dytan, there are several obstacles
to ensuring that taint-monitoring mechanisms obey the four tainting constraints listed in
Section 4.1. This subsection briefly summarizes these obstacles, most of which are discussed
in greater length elsewhere (e.g., [40, 20, 11, 29, 41]).
The first of the four tainting constraints in Section 4.1 requires all symbols input to the
application from untrusted sources to be tainted. Untrusted inputs may come from many
sources (e.g., HTTP GET and POST requests, cookies, server variables, or a database), and
enumerating all these untrusted sources may be difficult and error prone. Hence, following
Halfond, Orso, and Manolios, one might instead use positive tainting [20] (i.e., tracking
which output-program symbols derive from trusted sources, often just the string literals
hardcoded in an application). It would be straightforward to adjust this thesis’s definition
of CIAOs to use positive (rather than negative) tainting: CIAOs would occur when some
code symbol in an output program is not positively tainted.
The second and third of the four tainting constraints require that taints propagate
through exactly copy and output operations (for copy-based CIAOs), or all data opera-
tions (for data-dependency-based CIAOs). Because a taint bit must be tracked for every
input symbol, the tainting mechanism must operate with fine granularity, which previous
work has found to induce high runtime overhead (e.g., many thousands of percent of over-
head) [41, 21, 29]. In addition, monitoring taints typically requires executing applications
in modified runtime environments, which limits portability [13]. And propagating taints
through output operations, so output programs can be caught and checked prior to be-
ing executed, may be difficult; it may be hard to enumerate all the ways an application
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can output programs (e.g., to files, remote hosts, or standard output). If an application’s
outputs can circumvent a CIAO-mitigating mechanism, the mechanism is unsound. Ap-
plications might also circumvent taint-monitoring mechanisms by executing external (e.g.,
native) code [20].
The last of the four tainting constraints requires taints to be transparent. This trans-
parency ensures that taint tracking does not affect application behaviors; CIAO-preventing
mechanisms should only modify application behaviors when attacks are detected (in which
case the behavior must be modified to prevent injected code from being output). To be
transparent, tainting mechanisms have to isolate taints from applications. Hence, CIAO-
mitigating mechanisms cannot use bracketing techniques to track taints (e.g., [5])—the
brackets are visible to applications [7]. Another important obstacle to ensuring trans-
parency in practice is that runtime mechanisms generally induce overhead on application
performance, and this overhead may make time-sensitive applications behave differently.
Perfect transparency may therefore be difficult or impossible to achieve for time-sensitive
applications in practice.
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CHAPTER 6
SUMMARY
This thesis has defined code-injection attacks on outputs. The definition simply consid-
ers CIAOs to occur when untrusted inputs get used as nonvalues (or open values) in output
programs. This definition avoids problems with conventional CIAO definitions, which some-
times consider CIAOs to be non-CIAOs and vice versa.
The new definition of CIAOs has been used to:
1. Distinguish between copy-based CIAOs, data-dependency-based CIAOs, and CIntAOs
based on whether taints propagate through copy, data, or all (data and control) de-
pendencies.
2. Prove that a large class of applications (i.e., those that always blindly copy some
untrusted input to the output program) are inherently vulnerable to CIAOs and
CIntAOs, so sound static mechanisms must disallow these applications from execut-
ing.
3. Prove that precisely detecting CIAOs requires dynamic white-box mechanisms. The
generic design of such mechanisms follows immediately from the definition of CIAOs.
Under reasonable assumptions these mechanisms can be optimized to detect CIAOs
in output programs in O(n) time and space. Nonetheless, due to their reliance on
taint tracking, many obstacles impede implementation of precise CIAO-mitigating
mechanisms in practice.
Hence, the new definition of CIAOs has been used to analyze precisely when they occur,
how they can be mitigated, and how efficiently they can be mitigated. We hope these
results can serve as a foundation for improving the effectiveness of future CIAO-mitigating
mechanisms.
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